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THE FELONY MURDER DOCTRINE AND ITS
APPLICATION UNDER THE NEW YORK
STATUTES
ALBERT E. ARENT
JOHN W. MACDONALD

Although the felony murder doctrine has existed in the common
law for several centuries, it is difficult to state its precise scope. In its
broadest form it brings within the definition of murder all homicides
committed in the perpetration of any felony, regardless of whether
there existed an intention to cause death or great bodily harm. Yet
the decisions, whether in New York or elsewhere, except in dicta,
have never supported such a statement; if a rule were to be extracted
from the actual holdings of the cases, it would be confined within
much narrower boundaries. In the United States the felony murder
doctrine has found its way into the statutes of nearly all the statesapparently without provoking any serious doubts as to its merits
and without leading to any clearer definition of its scope. In the
following pages the New York law of felony murder will be examined
against its common law background and in comparison with the
law of other jurisdictions in an effort to determine what limits should
be placed upon its application-first as to the persons committing
the homicide and then as to their associates in the underlying felony.
FELONY MURDER AT COMMON LAW'

"Lawyer: A third kind of homicide is when a man kills another either by misfortune, or in the necessary defense of himself,
'At common law murdet was homicide with malice aforethought. Malice aforethought consisted of any of the following states of mind:
i. An intention to cause the death of, or grevious bodily harm to, any person,
whether such person is the person actually killed or not.
2. Knowledgethattheactor omission which causes death willprobably causethe
death of, or grievous bodily harm to, some person, whether the person killed or
another, although such knowledge is accompanied by indifference whether death
or grievous bodily harm is caused or not, or by a wish that it may not be caused.
3. An intent to oppose by force any officer of justice in arresting or keeping in
custody a person whom he has a right to arrest or keep in custody, or in keeping
the peace.
4. Anintent to commit any felony whatever. 3 STEPHEN, HiSTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND (1883) 21.
Query, under point 2, whether actual knowledge of the dangerous character of
the act or omission is necessary. An intention to do an act which will probably
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or of the King, or of his laws; for such killing is neither felony
nor crime, saving, as Sir Edward Coke says (3 Inst. p. 56), that
if the act that the man is doing, when he kills another man, be
unlawful, then it is murder. As, if A meaning to steal a deer in
the park of B, shooteth at the deer, and by a glance of the arrow
killeth a boy that is hidden in a bush, this is murder, for that the
act was unlawful; but if the owner of the park had done the like,
shooting at his own deer, it had been by misadventure, and no
felony.
"Philosopher: This is not distinguished by any statute but is
the common law only of Sir Edward Coke. I believe not a word of
it. If a boy be robbing an appletree, and falleth thence upon a
man that stands under it and breaks his neck, but by the same
chance saveth his own life, Sir Edward Coke, it seems, will have
him hanged for it, as if he had fallen of prepensed malice. All
that can be called crime in'this business is but a simple trespass,
to the damage perhaps of sixpence or a shilling. I confess the
trespass was an offense against the law, but the falling was none,
nor was it by the trespass but by the falling that a man was
slain; and as he ought to be quit' 2of the killing, so he ought to
make restitution for the trespass.
As early as 1536 it was held that if a person was killed accidentally
by one of the members of a band engaged in a felonious act, all
could be found guilty of murder.3 Coke's statement went further,
declaring that death resulting from any unlawful act was murder.
Foster narrowed this rule to unlawful acts which were also felonious
and malum in se.4 It is from Blackstone's statement of the rule
that the felony murder doctrine has become most widely known:
"When an involuntary killing happens in consequence of an
unlawful act, it will be either murder or manslaughter, according
to the nature of the act which occasioned it. If it be in prosecution of a felonious intent or in its consequences naturally tended
to bloodshed, it will be murder; but if no more was intended
than a mere civil trespass, it will only amount to manslaughter." 5
kill or do great bodily harm may in itself be sufficient to make the ensuing homicide murder, regardless of whether the actor knew that such result would probably follow. CLARK AND MARSHALL, CRIMES (3d ed. 1927) § 244.
For an excellent discussion of the whole subject of malice aforethought, see
Perkins, A Re-examination of Malice Aforethought (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 537. On
the particular subject of this section, see Brown, Constructive Murder and Felonious Intent (1909) 34 LAw MAG. & REv. 453; "Constructive Murder" (z929) 67
L. J. 450.
26 HOBBES, ENGLISH WORKS (Molesworth ed. 1840), Dialogueof the Common
Laws, 86, 87.
3Mansell & Herbert's Case, 2 Dyer 128b (I536).
4
FoSTER C. C. (1791) 258; 8 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW
(1926) 435, 536.
54 BL. COMM. *192, 193.
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Blackstone's view has been widely adopted in the United States
as a correct statement of the common law. 6
In England, however, the opinion has grown that Blackstone and
the other early text writers stated the law too broadly. Although in
1883 Judge Stephen wrote that murder differs from manslaughter
in that malice aforethought is present, and that an intent to commit
any felony whatever is one kind of malice aforethought,7 today it is
acknowledged that "After much difference of opinion, it may now
be taken that homicides resulting from the commission of a felony,
not involving danger to life, amount only to manslaughter." In
1862, in an annotation to the famous case of Rex v. Horsey,9 the need
for limiting the scope of the felony murder doctrine was forcefully
stated, and the suggestion made that the origin of the doctrine can
be found in the rule that a man may resist a felony attempted with
violence to the person even to the point of killing the malefactor,
but may not so resist a mere misdemeanor or trespass.10 When a person engaged in a crime in which he might lawfully be killed, the presumption arose that he himself meant to kill if he could not otherwise succeed-an intention sufficient to make the ensuing homicide
murder. The annotator admits the validity of this presumption
where the felonious act was homicidal in its nature and such as might
naturally cause death, but strenuously objects to its application to
acts not dangerous to human life. He expresses doubt that even
deaths caused accidentally in the perpetration of rape, where rape
was accomplished without independent and dangerous violence, are
to be considered murder. Finally, this admonition: "The extension
of the doctrine of constructive murder to statutable felonies would
be still more questionable than its application to a common law
felony only remotely likely to affect human life." Nearly all of the
common law felonies were of such a nature that the perpetration of
them involved a substantial risk to human life. They included arson,
burglary, larceny, rape, robbery, and those offences which directly
61 MITCHE,HOMICIDE (1914) 1I2; note (1904) 63

L. R. A. 353.

7

STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND (1883) 21, 22.
84 STEPHEN, NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (16th ed. 1914)

62.

93 Fost. & F. 287.
10A more widely accepted explanation of the origin of the doctrine is the following: "If the crime intended was a felony, as at common law practically all felonies
were punishable with death, either with or without benefit of clergy, the felonious
intent of the intended crime was imputed to the committed act, and, if it were
homicide, made it murder; for it was considered immaterial whether a man was
hanged for one felony or another." Powers v. Commonwealth, 110 Ky. 386, 413,
61 S. W. 735, 742 (i9oi); People v. Enoch, 13 Wend. 159, 174 (N. Y. 1834).
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contemplate death or great bodily injury. Larceny is the only one
which did not usually involve danger to human life. A recent study
of the decisions is said to reveal that cases applying the felony murder doctrine, whether English or American, invariably involve a
"dangerous" felony."
The common law doctrine regarding felony murders in England
today is stated in Halsbury's Laws of England 2 as follows: "Where a
person whilst committing or attempting to commit a felony does an
act known to be dangerous to life and likely in itself to cause death,
and the death of another person results as a consequence of that act,
though not intended by the person committing it, the law implies
malice aforethought and the person causing the death is guilty of
murder." Based upon a widely-quoted dictum by Judge Stephen in
Rex v. Sern6,1 this is said to be the way the present courts are instructing juries. 14 Such a charge, however, has been considered too
favorable for the defense."5 It overstates the extent to which danger
must be apparent in the felonious act. An obvious and strong likelihood that death or great bodily injury would result need not have
existed. It is sufficient that there was such chance of causing death
as a reasonable man would take into consideration.16 In England,
then, the particular felonious undertaking which caused the death
must have involved physical violence or danger to human life 7 ; it is
not enough, as it is in certain American jurisdictions, 8 that the
felony in which the defendant was engaged belongs to a general
class of felonies normally considered of a dangerous character.
Two other problems of current importance in connection with
felony murder were considered in the early common law, and rules
laid down which are still followed:
i. Whoever participates in the underlying felony, whether as
principal in the first or second degree or as accessory before the fact,
"Perldns, supra note I, at 561.
'Vol. 9 (2d ed. 1933) 437.
4
1316 Cox C. C. 311 (1887).
1 HALSBURY, 1oC. cit. supra note 12.
15"So here, the jury might have been directed that if Betts, while in the act of
committing a felonious act of violence against the person caused death by some
act done by him in the course of that felonious act of violence, then he was guilty
of murder... The case was left to the jury more favorably than was necessarythey were told that it was only if they were satisfied that the act which he did
was calculated in the judgment of ordinary people to cause death, that they should
find him guilty of murder." Rex v. Betts and Ridley, 22 Cr. App. R. 148 (1930).
16Regina v. Whitmarsh, 62 Just. P. 7H1 (1898); Rex v. Lumley, 22 Cox C. C.
635 (191); Perkins, supra note I, at 559, 560.
"Director of Public Prosecutions v. Beard, [1920] A. C. 479, (1920) 34 HARV.
L. REv. 78.
l8lnfra at p. 294.
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21)2

is responsible as principal or accessory for all that ensues in the prosecution of the felony, but not for acts distinct from the unlawful
undertaking.

19

2. "But in order to make the killing, by any, murder in all those
who are confederated together for an unlawful purpose, merely on
account of the unlawful act done or in contemplation, it must happen
during the actual strife or endeavor, or at least within such a reasonable time afterwards as may leave it probable that no fresh provocation intervened." 0
East's illustration is pertinent:
"Several persons were engaged in a smuggling transaction;
and upon an attempt to oppose their design by the king's officers,
one of the smugglers fired a gun, and killed one of his accomplices.
It was agreed by the Court, that if the gun were discharged at the
king's officers in prosecution of the original design, which was a
fact to be found by the jury, it would be murder in them all,
although one of the accomplices happened to be killed. But if
done intentionally and with deliberation against the accomplice
from anger or some precedent malice in the party firing, it would
be murder in him only. In order, therefore, to affect the particular case by the general purpose in view at the time the death
happened, the killing must be in pursuance of such unlawful
purpose and not collateral to it.121

STATUTORY ADOPTION

OF

FELONY MURDER DOCTRINE

IN NEW YORK STATE

In the first Revised Statutes passed in 1828 New York adopted
the felony murder doctrine as stated by the old common law writers,
providing that the killing of a human being was murder "when perpetrated without any design to effect death, by a person engaged in
the commission of any felony."22
By the Laws of 386o,2 the crime of murder was divided into the
first and second degrees, defined as follows:
"All murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison,
or by lying in wait, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate
and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the
perpetration or the attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape,
robbery, or burglary, or in any attempt to escape from imprisonment, shall be deemed murder of the first degree, and all other
kinds of murder shall be deemed murder of the second degree."
194 BL. Comm. *37. Illustrative of the exception is Rex v. Hawkins, 3 C. & P.
392 (1828), where after poachers had beaten a gamekeeper senseless and departed, one returned to rob him; the court held that the others were not guilty
of the robbery.
201 EAST P. C. 259 (1806).
2Rex. v. Plummer, Kel. 1o9 (1701).
22 N. Y. REv. STAT. (1829) 657, § 5 (3).

2C. 410, § 2.
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Two years later this act was repealed, and the provisions of the
Revised Statutes were in substance re-enacted, except that homicides
perpetrated while committing the crime of arson remained murder
in the first degree and all other felony murders became murder of
the second degree.u
The act of 1862 in turn was amended by the Laws of 1873,
restoring all felony murders to the first degree and readopting the
wording of the original Revised Statutes. By an amendment in 1876
the words "without any design to effect death" were omitted, 5 but
27
these were restored in 1881 when the Penal Code was passed.
In the Penal Code the section on felony murder reached its present
form. With a petty change in 188228 and with the addition of the
present subdivision 4 by the Laws of 1897,29 the rest of the definition
of first degree murder attained the form in which it now appears. 1
The present Section 1044 of the Penal Law reads as follows:
"The killing of a human being, unless it is excusable or justifiable, is murder in the first degree, when committed:
"i. From a deliberate and premeditated design to effect the
death of the person killed, or of another; or,
"2. By an act imminently dangerous to others, and evincing a
depraved mind, regardless of human life, although without a
premeditated design to effect the death of any individual; or without a design to effect death, by a person engaged in the commission
of, or in an attempt to commit a felony, either upon or affecting the
person killed or otherwise; or,
"3. When perpetrated in committing the crime of arson in the
first degree.
"4. A person who wilfully, by loosening, removing or displacing
a rail, or by any other interference, wrecks, destroys or so injures any car, tender, locomotive or railway train, or part thereof,
while moving upon any railway in this State, whether operated
by steam, electricity or other motive power, as to thereby cause
the death of a human being, is guilty of murder in the first degree, and punishable accordingly." 3'
The words "upon or affecting the person killed or otherwise" in
subdivision 2 have been held to include a felony on a person other
than the decedent,32 but not to limit the rule to felonies affecting
2
ALaws of 1862, C. 197, § 5; Fitzgerrold v. People, 37 N. Y. 413 (z868).
25C. 644, § i.

2Laws of 1876, c. 333, § I.
28
Laws of 1882, C. 384, § I.
30

27

Laws of 1881, c. 676, § 183.
29C. 548, § i.

N. Y. CONS. LAWS (1909) C. 40, PENAL LAW § 1044.

3ltalics are the writers'.
32People v. Miles, 143 N. Y. 383, 38 N. E. 456 (1894); People v. Patini, 2o8
N. Y. 176, IOI N. E. 694 (1913).
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persons only." Likewise, the courts have declared that the words
"without a design to effect death" do not limit the felony murder
rule to unintentional killings, but merely indicate that the element
of intent is immaterial.14 Subdivision 3 adds nothing to the preceding
subdivision and is attributable to bad draftsmanship."6
FELONY MURDER PROVISIONS IN STATUTES OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS

Only five states have statutes similar to that of New York, making
the killing of a human being by a person engaged in the commission
of, or in an attempt to commit, any felony the crime of murder in
the highest degree." The statute of the District of Columbiais the same
in effect, but it refers to crimes punishable with imprisonment in the
penitentiary instead of to felonies. 37 Two states make such killing
in the commission of any felony murder in the third degree. 8
Most of the other American jurisdictions reserve their severest
punishments for killings perpetrated in the commission of certain
specified felonies, leaving those perpetrated in the course of lesser
felonies to fall under the designation of murder in the second or
third degree or manslaughter. Usually the felonies of arson, rape,
robbery and burglary are specified.3 9 Several states add mayhem to
this list.40 Maryland, New Jersey and North Dakota add sodomy;4'
"People v. Greenwall, Ix5 N. Y. 520, 22 N. E. 18o (1889).
UCox v. People, 80 N. Y. 500 (I88O); People v. Schlieman, I97 N.,Y. 383, 90
N. E. 950 (I93O); People v. Sobieskoda, 235 N. Y. 411, 339 N. E. 538 (1923).

"People v. Greenwall, 335 N. Y. 520, 22 N. E. i8o (1889).
"KAN. REV. STAT. ANN. (1923) § 21-401; N. M. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1929)
§ 35-304; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) § 42oo; OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Harlow,
1931) § 2216; S. D. CoMP. LAWS (1929) § 4012.
37D. C. CODE (1929) tit. 6, § 21.
38MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 10070; WIs. STAT. (1933) § 340.09.
39ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 3928) § 4454; ALASKA CoMp. LAws (3913) § 1883;
CONN. GEN. STAT. (3930) § 6043; FLA. COMP. GEN. LAWS ANN. (1927) § 7137;
IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) § io-3403; MIcH. CoMp. LAWS (3929) § 16708;
MISS. CODE ANN. (1930) § 985; NEB. CoMp. STAT. (1929) § 28-4oI; NEV. COMp.
LAws (Hillyer, 1930) § 30068; N. H. PUB. LAws (3926) c. 392, § I; OHIO CODE
ANN. (Throcmaorton, 1934) § 12400; ORE. CODE ANN. (930) § 14-201; R. I.
GEN. LAWS (1923) § 6oi3; UTAH REV. STAT. ANN. (i933) § 103-21-3; VT. PUB.
LAWS (934) § 8374; VA. CODE (Michie, 3930) § 4393; W. VA. CODE (Michie,
1932) § 5916; Wyo. REv. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1933) § 32--204.
40
ARiz. REV. CODE ANN. (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 4584; CAL. PEN. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 187; COLO. ANN. STAT. (Mills, 3930) § 6665; IDAHO CODE ANN. (932)
§ 17- 304; IOWA CODE (3931) § 12910; MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 3924) art. 27,
§ 397; Mo. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1932) § 3982; MONT. REV. CODE ANN. (Choate,
1921) § 10953; N. D. CoMp. LAws ANN. (1913) § 9462; P. R. CoMP. REv. STAT. &
CODES (1913) § 199.
41

MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 27, § 397; N. J. CoMp. STAT. (i933) tit.

52,

§

io6;

N. D.

CoMP. LAws ANN. (i933) § 9462.
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Pennsylvania adds kidnapping;2 and Arkansas, Tennessee, and
43
Washington add larceny.
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, South Carolina, and Texas make no
specific mention of felony murders, but seem to include them within
the meaning of "willful murder" or "homicide with malice aforethought", which are taken to embrace murder as it exists at common
law." Georgia and Illinois do the same, except that to their sections
on involuntary homicide are appended reservations providing that
45
homicides committed in the course of a felony shall be murder.
In Delaware and Hawaii, murder in the first degree covers only
homicides which occur in the commission of, or in the attempt to
commit, crimes punishable with death, 4 and in Massachusetts
crimes punishable with death or life imprisonment.47 Other felony
murders appear to be of the second degree.
In Minnesota and Wisconsin, where homicide committed in the
perpetration of any felony is only third degree murder, felony murder
is punishable by a minimum prison sentence of seven years, with a
maximum of thirty years in the former state and of fourteen in the
latter.4 8 In all other American jurisdictions discussed above, except
Texas and Illinois, felony murders are punishable by no less than
death or life imprisonment. Texas and Illinois have five and fourteen
years respectively as their minimum punishment for murder, but
49
the maximum is life imprisonment or death.
In Canada and New Zealand an accidental killing is murder if it
occurs in the commission of certain specified felonies, provided that
the felon intended to inflict grievous bodily harm for the purpose of
facilitating his felonious purpose or his escape.50 Bermuda has the
same provision for all offenses as to which an arrest can be made
without a warrant, and also a provision that death caused by an act
EPA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. I8, § 2221.
4
ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) § 2343; TENN. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1932) § 10767; WAsH. REv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) tit. I4, § 2392.
4
Kentucky and Louisiana have no statutory definition of murder. ME. REv.
STAT. (1930) c. 129, § I; S. C. CODE (Michie, 1932) § 11; TEx. ANN. PEN. CODE
(Vernon, 1925) art. 1256.
4
1GA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1926) §§ 6o, 67; ILL. REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 38,

§§ 337, 342.

46DEL. REv. CODE (I915) § 4697; HAWAII REV. LAWS (1925) § 4115.
47MAss. GEN. LAWS (1932) C. 265, § I.
48
MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 10070; WIs. STAT. (1933) § 340.09.
49ILL. REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 38, § 339; TEX. ANN. PEN. CODE (Vernon,
1925) art. 1257.
50

CANADA CRIM. CODE

(I908) No. 32, § 183.

(Tremeear,

1929) 260; NEW ZEALAND CONSOL. STAT.
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done in prosecution of an unlawful purpose is murder if the act is of
such nature as to be likely to endanger human life.5 These statutes
reflect the development in the English law away from the doctrine
that death caused during the commission of any felony is murder.
The sentence in each of these countries for the type of murder described is death.
In Germany, unless changes have been made by the Hitler government, homicide committed in the course of a felony is not found
among the homicide statutes, but appears in the guise of aggravated
degrees of the various crimes.52 In most cases the punishment for an
aggravated felony is imprisonment for from ten years to life.
DEFINITION

OF FELONY

At common law a felony was an offense which occasioned a total
forfeiture of land or goods or both, to which capital or other punishment might be superadded.53 In New York a felony is defined by
Section 2 of the Penal Law as "a crime which is or may be punishable
by death or imprisonment in a state prison." This section seems to
create a new class of felonies, to which the felony murder doctrine
by the terms of Section 1044 of the Penal Law is applicable. Two
early cases bear out such an interpretation. In People v. Enoch,54
the court declared that "as often as the legislature creates new felonies,
or raises offences which were only misdemeanors at the common law
to the grade of felony, a new class of murders is created by the application of this principle to the case of killing of a human being, by a per'
son who is engaged in the perpetration of a newly created felony.-Ma
55
In People v. Van Steenburg, a homicide committed by a person
engaged in a crime punishable by imprisonment in state prison
or in county jail or by a fine was held to be a felony murder.
A subsequent case, Fassett v. Smith,"6 seemed to intimate, however,
that the statute, which then defined felony as "an offense for which
the offender on conviction shall be liable to be punished by death,
51

BERMUDA LAWS (1690-1930) § 238.
DEUTSCHE REICHGESETZE (Sch6nfelder, 1931), STRAFGESETZBUCH FUR DAS

52

DEUTSCHE REICH, §§ 178, 251, 307, 315. See also §§ 221, 226, 229, 239, 321-323.
64 BL. COmm. *94, 95-

5113 Wend. I59, 174 (N. Y. 1834).

1a"So, on the other hand, when the Legislature abolishes an offense which at
the common law was a felony, or reduces it to the grade of misdemeanor only, the
case of an unlawful killing, by a person engaged in an act which was before a felony, will no longer be considered to be murder, but manslaughter merely." Ibid.
551 Park Cr. 39 (N. Y. x845). Accord: State v. Smith, 32 Me. 369 (i85i); State
v. Green, 66 Mo. 631 (1877).
623 N. Y. 252 (1861).
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or by imprisonment in a state prison",5 7 did not assume to define the
term "felony" except when used in a statute, leaving the common law
to govern wherever an offense is not specifically labeled "felony".
This interpretation of the case was soon discarded, and the statements of the court were taken to mean only that a crime punishable
in either state prison or county jail in the alternative was not a
felony within the terms of the statute. 8 Accepting this as the law,
the court in Foster v. People' declared that assault with a dangerous
weapon, punishable by imprisonment in state prison or county jail,
could not be made the basis of a charge of felony murder. The
confused statements of the Fassett case were later discredited by the
Court of Appeals in People v. Lyon,"° which established that if under
the terms of a statute the offender is liable to be punished by imprisonment in the state prison, the offense is a felony, regardless of
other possible sentences, such as a fine or imprisonment in the county
jail. This decision would appear to have deprived the dictum in the
Foster case of any foundation, leaving the Van Steenburg decision
unchallenged.
In reference to the immediate question before it, the Fassett case
held simply that one who purchases in good faith and for value from
a person who procured the property by false pretenses obtains a good
title. This was the rule at common law, where obtaining goods by
false pretenses was not a felony, and is still the rule in New York,
where by statute such conduct has been made a felony, despite the
principle that the owner of property feloniously taken can follow
and reclaim it wherever found. 61 The creation of new statutory
felonies, according to Benedict v. Williams,'2 does not necessarily
affect or extend the operation of rules of the common law applicable
in their rationale only to common law felonies. There was a more fundamental reason at common law for enabling a bona fide purchaser
to obtain title to property obtained by false pretenses, but not to
property obtained by common law larceny, than the mere fact that
the latter was a felony and the former was not. "Larceny at common
572

N. Y. REv.

STAT.

(1829) 702.

ksPeople v. Park, 41 N. Y. 21 (1869).
595o N. Y. 598, 604 (1872).
6099 N. Y. 210, I N. E. 673 (1885), re'g, People v. Lyon, 33 Hun 623 (1884).
Accord: People v. Hughes, 137 N. Y. 29, 32 N. E. 1105 (1893), citing, People v.

Borges, 6 Abb. Pr. 132 (1858); People v. Hayman, 94 Misc. 624, 159 N. Y. Supp.
981 (1916); People ex rel. Childs v. Knott, 187 App. Div. 604, 614, 176 N. Y.
Supp. 321, 328 (Ist Dept. igig).
"'But cf. Amols v. Bernstein, 214 App. Div. 469,212 N. Y. Supp. 518 (Ist Dept.
1925); note (1926) II CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 422.
6248 Hun 123 (N. Y. 1888).
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law was the feloniously taking property, which was without the consent of the owner, while the obtaining of it by false pretenses was produced by the consent and delivery of it by the owner to the fraudulent vendee, and when so delivered, with the intent at the time being
to part with the title and invest it in the latter, the effect of the common law larceny was not given to it so as to defeat the title of a bona
fide purchaser for value."6 3 The reason for this distinction, the court
pointed out, continues to exist despite the fact that obtaining property by false pretenses has been made a statutory felony.
The early decisions holding the felony murder doctrine applicable
to statutory felonies have raised no discussion and seem to be accepted as the law. It is not inconceivable, however, that some court,
unwilling to extend the harsh theory of felony murder to statutory
felonies which were not included in the common law doctrine, may
pick up the suggestion of the Benedict case and say that the doctrine
of felony murder found its justification at common law in the dangerous character of nearly all the common law felonies and hence should
not be applied to statutory felonies which do not involve similar
risk to human life.63a
NATURE OF THE UNDERLYING FELONY

Every time a homicide which is not justifiable or excusable is
committed, the killer may be said to have been engaged in a felony.
To hold him guilty of felony murder, however, would eliminate all
existing distinctions between murder and manslaughter and their
various degrees. A necessary qualification of the felony murder rule,
therefore, is that the felony in which the defendant was engaged must
have been independent of the homicide. For a number of years"the
New York courts struggled with the question whether the felony
murder theory could ever by applied where the acts of violence
which constituted the felony were the very acts which caused the
death. In Buel v. People" it was finally established, however, that a
felony murder conviction may be based upon an attempt at rape,
even though death was caused by the acts of violence which constituted the felonious attempt, the court pointing out that "While
force and violence constitute an important element of the crime of
0Id. at 126.
6See Powers v. Commonwealth, nIo Ky. 386, 415, 46, 6i S. W. 735, 742
(igoi). In People v. Pavlie, 227 Mich. 562, I99 N. W. 373 (1924), the court refused to apply the felony murder doctrine to the statutory felony of selling liquor
on the ground it was only malum prohibitum, not malum in se.
"78 N. Y. 492 (1879), a~fg, Buel v. People, I8 Hun 487 (1879) on broader
grounds. The early New York cases are reviewed in these decisions.

FELONY MURDER DOCTRINE
rape, they do not constitute the entire body of that offense." From
this developed the present rule that although there need be no acts
collateral to or independent of those which caused death, the elements
constituting the underlying felony must be so distinct from those of
the homicide as not to be an ingredient of the homicide, indictable
therewith or convictable thereunder. 6
The problem of the merger in the homicide of a felonious assault
upon the decedent did not arise in connection with the felony murder
doctrine at common law, because an,intent to cause grievous bodily
harm, or knowledge that the acts causing death will probably cause
such harm, was in itself sufficient to constitute the killing murder.
Under statutes like those in New York, however, with their attempt
at precise definition of different degrees of murder and manslaughter,6
the courts faced something of a dilemma. To apply the felony murder
principle would convert many homicides which fall within the definition of second degree murder or manslaughter into first degree murder-as where death results from an assault with intent to kill made
in the heat of passion. On the other hand, death resulting from a
simple felonious assault falls within the wording of the felony murder
sections and does not otherwise come within the statutory definitions
of murder or manslaughter; yet it could hardly be intended to let
such homicide go unpunished. Seven years after the Buel case, one
appellate court still regarded it as an open question whether death
resulting from a felonious assault would support a charge of felony
murder.6 7 In recent years, however, the law has been settled as
follows:
Where the assault is committed upon the deceased, it becomes
merged in the homicide and cannot be made the basis of a conviction
for felony murder. 8 But where the killing occurs while the defendant
6
1People v. Huter, 184 N. Y. 237, 77 N. E. 6 (19o6); People v. Spohr, 206 N. Y.
ioo, ioo N. E. 444 (1912).
6PENAL LAW §§ 1044-1052.

"7People v. Sweeney, 41 Hun 332 (N. Y. 1886).
6

People v. Huter, 184 N. Y. 237, 77 N. E. 6 (19o6); People v. Spohr, 206 N. Y.
ioo N. E. 444 (1912); People v. Moran, 246 N. Y. 1oo, 158 N. E. 35 (1927).

ioo,

Accord: State v. Fisher,

120

Kan.

226, 243

Pac.

291 (1926),

Citing

29 C. J. 1107.

Faced with the same problem as New York regarding deaths resulting from felonious assaults, Missouri held at first that the assault was a proper basis for a charge
of felony murder. State v. Jennings, x8 Mo. 435 (1853); State v. Nuesslein, 25
Mo. I Ii (1857). These cases were overruled, however, by State v. Shock, 68 Mo.
552 (1878), in which both sides of the problem are ably discussed in majority and
dissenting opinions and in which the early New York cases are critically analyzed.
The statute was subsequently changed to eliminate the ambiguity by limiting the
felony murder rule to "arson, rape, robbery, burglary, and mayhem" instead of
the former "arson, rape, robbery, burglary, or other felony".
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is engaged in a felonious assault upon a person other than the deceased, the assault may be treated as an independent felony and will
sustain a charge of felony murder. 9 The difference between these two
situations is well illustrated in the case of People v. Wagner,70 where
the defendant, interrupted in an assault Upon A, assaulted and killed
the interfering party, B. The court held that the assault upon A
would sustain a conviction of felony murder for the death of B, but
that the assault upon B was merged in the homicide and could not
serve as the independent felon j necessary for such a conviction.
7 the
In People v. Marendij
felony of carrying concealed weapons
was held to be merged in the homicide.
The felony murder rule has been applied in New York to homicides
committed in the perpetration of the following independent felonies:
burglary, 72 robbery, 73 rape,7 4 escaping from prison, 71 escaping from
arrest for a felony, 7 tramp entering building against the will of the
owner or occupant,77 and assault upon a person other than the decedent.78 No cases of homicide from arson have been discovered, but
arson is obviously within the general doctrine and is also specifically
69

People v. Giblin, 115 N. Y. 196, 21 N. E. 1o62 (1889); People v. Patini, 208
N. Y. 176, ioi N. E. 694 (i913); People v. Van Norman, 231 N. Y. 5 , 132 N. E.
4 4

147 (i9I).
70245 N. Y. 143, i56 N. E. 644 (1927).
7213 N. Y. 6o0, 107 N. E. io58 (I919). It was formerly understood
that to

support a charge of manslaughter under Penal Law § io5o, the misdemeanor in
which defendant was engaged at the time of the time of the homicide need not
have been separate from the act of killing. People v. Stacy, ii9 App. Div. 743,
io4 N. Y. Supp. 6x5 (3d Dept. 1907); People v. Darragh, 141 App. Div. 4o8, 726
N. Y. Supp. 522 (1st Dept. i9io). In a recent opinion, however, the Court of
Appeals follows the analogy of merger of the felony in the homicide and holds
that the misdemeanor of reckless driving is merged in the charge of first degree
manslaughter. People v. Grieco, 266 N. Y. 48, 193 N. E. 292 (i934).
72Dolan v. People, 64 N. Y. 485 (1876); People v. Sullivan, 173 N. Y. 122, 65
N. E. 989 (i9o3); People v. Giro, 197 N. Y. 152, 90 N. E. 432 (I9io); People v.
Marwig, 227 N. Y. 382, 125 N. E. 535 (I919).
73
People v. Wise, 163 N. Y. 440, 57 N. E. 740 (i9oo); People v. Lingley, 207
N. Y. 396, ioi N. E. 170 (1913); People v. Michalow, 229 N. Y. 325, 128 N. E.
228 (1920); People v. Slover, 232 N. Y. 264, 133 N. E. 633 (1921); People v.
Florence, 146 Misc. 735, 262 N. Y. Supp. 775 (I933).
74
Buel v. People, 78 N. Y. 492 (1879); People v. Schermerhorn, 203 N. Y. 57,
96 N. . 376 (i911); Peoplev. Walter, 203 N. Y. 484,97 N. B. 3o (1911).
75
People v. Johnson, ixo N. Y. 134, 17 N. E. 684 (1888); People v. Flanigan,
174 N. Y. 356, 66 N. E. 988 (I9O3).
7
People v. Wilson, 145 N. Y. 628, 4o N. E. 392 (7895).
"People v. Deacons, io9 N. Y. 374, x6 N. B. 676 (1888).
78
People v. Giblin, xi5 N. Y. 196, 2z N. E. io62 (1889); People v. Patini, 208
N. Y. 176, ioi N. . 694 (1913); People v. Van Norman, 231 N. Y. 54, 132 N. E.
4
147 (1927); People v. Wagner, 245 N. Y. x43, 156 N. E. 644 (1927).
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mentioned in a separate paragraph of the statute covering first
degree murder.79
With the exception of the peculiar felony affecting tramps, these
crimes form the basis of felony murder convictions wherever the
doctrine exists. 80 Other jurisdictions also include the felonies of
abortion and derailing trains, but in New York these situations are
covered by special provisions of the Penal Law.8 '
THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE UNDERLYING FELONY AND
THE HOMICIDE

The New York statute stipulates only that the killing be "by a
person engaged in the commission of, or in an attempt to commit a
felony, either upon or affecting the person killed or otherwise."8 2
A statute of this type, according to Perkins,m "seems to cover every
case in which there was a legally recognizable causal connection between the felonious act and the death, however remote the element
of human risk may seem to have been." The absence of comment
in the New York cases on the character of the felony and its tendency
to endanger life appears to justify this observation. One might suppose, therefore, that no matter how peaceful or mild the felony, or
how unpredictable or accidental the ensuing homicide, the felon
would be guilty of first degree murder.
It is sometimes stated as a general rule that though the felony be
not dangerous to life, and the killing be accidental, still the homicide
is murder.M The statement that the killing may be accidental finds
support not only in dicta, but in clear holdings.8 As indicated pre71PENAL LAW § 1044 (3).
60Extensive citations can be found in I MITCHIE, HomIcIDE (i914) i16-n19.
PENAL LAW §§ Io5o, 1044 (4). Section io5o specifically makes it manslaughter

81

in the first degree to cause the death of a woman by supplying or administering to
her any drug or instrument intended to procure a miscarriage. PENAL LAW § 82
makes the supplying of such materials with the intent to produce a miscarriage a
felony, so that, except for § io5o, death produced by such means would be murder
in the first degree. Section 1991 makes it a felony to cause certain injuries to railroad property, and § 1o44 (4) specifically makes it first-degree murder to cause
the death of a human being by such injuries to railroad property. Unless it can be
said that the commission of the felony under § iggi ends when the defendant has
finished loosening the rail or otherwise creating a dangerous situation, so that defendant is no longer engaged in a felony when the homicide occurs, the homicide
would seem to fall under the felony murder doctrine, and § 1O44 (4) duplicates
§ 1044 (2).
8PENAL LAW § i044.
83Supra note i, at 563.
82 BIsHoP, CRIMINAL LAW

(9th ed.

1923) 527.

mCommonwealth v. Lessner, 274 Pa. io8, 118 Atl.

24 (1922); McCutcheon v.
State, 199 Ind. 247, 155 N. E. 544 (1927); Commonwealth v. McManus, 28 Pa.
25, 127 Atl. 316 (1925); People v. Udwin, 254 N. Y. 255, 172 N. E. 489 (1930);

State v. Best, 44 Wyo. 383,

12 P.

(2d) IIIO

(1932).
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viously, however, the statement as to non-dangerous felonies appears
to be based upon dicta alone. There is some evidence that the courts
will not apply the felony murder rule to such non-violent felonies
as selling liquor or removing a cornerstone.8 8 . Powers v. Commonwealth l and State v. Glover8 7 are outstanding among the American
cases for their intelligent attempt to define the boundaries of the
felony murder doctrine. In the latter the court concludes that the
weight of authority requires that "the homicide must be an ordinary
and probable effect of the felony", pointing out that if the defendant
had no reason to believe any one would be injured, the killing is not
the natural and probable result.88 It is significant that the Glover
case was decided under a statute which applies the felony murder
doctrine only to certain specified felonies of a type usually considered
dangerous to human life.89 It seems, therefore, to go as far as some
of the English cases in requiring not merely a felony of the kind
usually considered dangerous, but also some foreseeability of risk to
human life in the particular acts undertaken. The language of the
statute no more suggested such an interpretation than does the
language of the New York statute. Since there is no felony murder
case in New York which does not involve a dangerous felony and
human risk which a reasonable man might anticipate, the courts
may yet hesitate, despite the broad language of the statute, to apply
the rule to non-violent felonies or to acts from which danger to human
life is extremely remote.
Although the New York statute speaks only of a "killing by a
person engaged in" committing or attempting a felony, Buel v.
People says that it is necessary to show that "death ensued in consequence of the felony".9 Under a statute similarly worded, the Wis85

People v. Pavlic, 227 Mich. 562, I99 N. W. 373 (1924). See Powers v. Commonwealth, 11o Ky. 386, 4x6, 61 S. W. 735, 742 (1901).
s albid.
.
8733o Mo. 709, 50 S. W. (2d) 1049 (1932), 87 A. L. R. 414 (1933). The defendant
set fire to a building; held, the death of a fireman in fighting the fire was a natural
and probable result of the arson.
88
d. at 719, 722, 50 S. W. (2d) at 1052, 1054. In 29 C. J. 1073 there is a similar
statement to the effect that the homicide must be an ordinary and probable result,
but both of the supporting citations go only so far as to say that a co-conspirator
in a felony murder can be held only for the natural and probable effects of the
common felonious design-a distinct-proposition to be discussed later in this report.
894 Mo. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1932) § 3982.
'078 N. Y. 4 92, 497 (1879). Where the commission of a robbery causes deceased
to be killed by the shot of a third person, the robbers may be guilty of first degree
murder. Wilson v. State, 188 Ark. 846, 68 S. W. (2d) oo (1934), note (1934) 25
J. CRm. L. 283; Taylor v. State, 4' Tex. Crim. R. 564, 55 S. W. 961 (igoo);
Keaton v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. R. 621, 57 S. W. 1125 (1900).
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consin court refused to consider the felony murder rule in connection
with the death of a family in a fire alleged to have been caused by
defendant while attempting rape, declaring that "the felony committed must have some intimate and close relation with the killing
and must not be separate, distinct, and independent from it."9 In
Texas, where driving while intoxicated is made a felony, one who was
driving while intoxicated when a fiat tire causes his car to swerve
into a ditch and kill somebody was not considered subject to a charge
of felony murder.Y These cases suggest the rather extreme decision
of Regina v. Horsey,9 3 where a person committing arson was not held
responsible for the death of a tramp who entered the enclosure after
the fire had been set, on the ground that the intervening act of the
tramp had broken the causal chain.
Since the Buel case, the New York courts have not spoken in terms
of causation, but have looked to see whether the homicide occurred
while the defendant was "engaged in the commission of, or in an
attempt to commit a felony" as required by the terms of the statute.
The problem of causation seems to be chiefly a question of the duration of the felony or attempt. Only killings committed during the
period between the inception of the attempt to commit the felony
and the consummation of the felony or the frustration and abandonment of the attempt will be treated as felony murders.9
The question of when the perpetration of the felony has ceasedby completion or abandonment of the undertaking-is constantly
being litigated before the Court of Appeals.95 Convictions for felony
murder have been reversed when the evidence showed that at the
time of the homicide defendant was no longer engaged in the assault
upon a third person which was the underlying felony relied on by the
prosecution.9" Likewise, in connection with burglaries and robberies,
which create the most vexing problems and are most often appealed,
it has been held error to submit the theory of felony murder where it
9

Pliemling v. State, 46 Wis. 516, i N. W. 278 (1879).
9Burton v. State, 122 Tex. Crim. App. 363, 55 S. W. (2d) 813 (1932).
933 Fost. & F. 287 (1862).
4
People v. Ryan, 263 N. Y. 298, 189 N. E. 225 (1934), note (1934) 25 J. CRIM.
L. 283. See editorial, Necessity for the Continuance of the Underlying Crime, N. Y,
L. J., Feb. 9, I, 1935, at 722, 746.

95
The question of when the felony may be said to have begun-that is, when
the plan has progressed far enough to constitute an attempt-is fully discussed
in People v. Sullivan, I73 N. Y. 122, 65 N. B. 989 (19o3) and People v. Sobieskoda, 235 N. Y. 411, 139 N. E. 558 (1923).
9
6People v. Marendi, 213 N. Y. 6oo, 107 N. E. io58 (1915); People v. Moran,
246 N. Y. ioo, 158 N. E. 35 (1927); Hoffman v. State, 88 Wis. 166, 59 N. W. 588
(1894).
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is clear from such facts as departure from the premises and abandonment of the loot that the defendant was no longer engaged in the
commission of a felony when the killing occurred. 7
While it is possible to have situations where only one conclusion
can be drawn as to whether or not the homicide took place during the
commission of the felony, the instances where a trial judge may
charge the point as a matter of law are exceptional.98 Normally the
question is for the jury; and where under any reasonable interpretation the facts might support a belief that the underlying felony had
been consummated or abandoned, it is error not to submit this
possibility to the jury. 99 The instruction in such a case should point
out generally:
"That the killing to be felony murder must occur while the
actor or one or more of his confederates is engaged in securing
the plunder or in doing something immediately connected with
the underlying crime (Dolan v. People, 64 N. Y. 485); that
escape may, under certain unities of time, manner and place,
be a matter so intimately connected with the crime as to be part
of its commission (People v. Giro, 197 N. Y. 152); but that where
there is no reasonable doubt of a complete intervening desistance
from the crime, as by the abandonment of the loot, and running
away, the subsequent homicide is not murder in the first degree
without proof of deliberation and intent. (People v. Marwig,
" °
227 N. Y. 382). "1
Presence on the premises is important as indicating that the criminal
was still engaged in the original crime.' 0' But it is not conclusive.
Where the defendant had been captured in the attempted robbery
and had been handcuffed, his subsequent firing of a gun on the prem10 2
ises was held not to have occurred in the commission of the felony.
On the other hand, merely leaving the premises is not sufficient to
'TPeople v. Young, 40 Misc. 256, 8I N. Y. Supp. 967 (19O3); People v. Huter,
184 N. Y. 237, 77 N. E. 6 (19o6); People v. Marwig, 227 N. Y. 382, 125 N. E .535
(i919). In a lucid dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. Dorris, 8 Pa. D. & C.
(Ct. of Oyer and Terminer, 1926), Gordon, Jr., J. reviews the New York cases
with approval and suggests that a distinction has been drawn between attempted
escapes from the actual scene of the crime and flight after an escape has been
effected. Cf. People v. Giro, 197 N. Y. 152, 9o N. E. 432 (19io), with People v.
Marwig, supra.
9
People v. Walsh, 262 N. Y. I4O, i86 N. E. 422 (I933).
"People v. Smith, 232 N. Y. 239, 133 N. E. 574 (1921); People v. Collins, 234
N. Y. 355, 137 N. E. 753 (1922); People v. Walsh, 262 N. Y. I4o, 186 N. E, 422
(I933); People v. Ryan, 263-N. Y. 298, 189 N. E. 225 (I934).
1'0 People v. Walsh, 262 N. Y. 14o, 148, 186 N. E. 422, 424 (1933).
"'0 People v. Dolan, 64 N. Y. 485 (1876); People v. Myer, 162 N. Y. 357, 56
N. E. 758 (igoo); People v. Michalow, 229 N. Y..325, 128 N. E. 228 (1920).
102People v. Smith, 232 N. Y. 239, 133 N. E. 574 (1921).
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clear the defendant of the felony. Where his accomplice remains upon
the premises and a killing occurs, defendant is held for this natural
result of the criminal scheme which he helped to initiate; it may be
too late to retire."' Or the defendant might have been entirely outside the building when he shot and still have been engaged in the
robbery, if he was getting away with the loot or was doing anything
to aid his confederates in getting away with it."1
By setting narrow limits to the time during which a felony may
be considered in progress, New York has substantially reduced the
applicability of the stringent felony murder rule. Not all states have
been so lenient. In a few jurisdictions if the killing is so closely connected with the robbery as to be part of the res gestae, it is considered
part of the felony, even though it occurs during flight and after defendant had abandoned the loot and left the building." 5 The Pennsylvania courts have gone so far as to convict of felony murder a robber
who was arrested as he attempted to flee and whose companions,
having abandoned the property, later shot a policeman while trying
to make good their own escape.' Where the robbers have not relinquished the property in their flight, the courts generally, including
the New York courts, are inclined to consider the felony still in prog1 07
ress.
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ACCOMPLICE IN THE UNDERLYING FELONY

FOR THE ENSUING HOMICIDE

A large number of decisions in New York hold that a person who
engages in a felony in the commission of which one of his confederates
causes the death of a human being shares that confederate's responsibility for the homicide. The courts follow three different lines
of reasoning in attaining this result:
i. Some cases proceed on the theory that "the penal responsibility
203People v. Nichols, 23o N. Y. 221, 129 N. E. 883 (1921).
' 04People v. Huter, 184 N. Y. 237, 77 N. E. 6 (igo6); People v. Udwin, 254
N. Y. 255, 263, 172 N. E. 489, 492 (1930); People v. Butler, 254 N. Y. 624, 173
N. 0E. 894 (1930); People v. Walsh, 262 N. Y. i4o, 148, 186 N. E. 422, 424 (1933).
0'Conrad v. State, 75 Ohio St. 52, 78 N. E. 957 (19o6), citing, Bissot v. State,
53 Ind. 4o8 (1876) and Francis v. State, 104 Neb. 5, 175 N. W. 676 (I919).
1
'6Commonwealth v. Doris, 287 Pa. 547, 135 Atl. 313 (1926), opinion of lower
court noted in (1927) 4o HARV. L. REV. 65I. See Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 282

Pa. 128, 132, 127 At. 465, 467 (1925). In general the attitude of the New York
Courts is said to prevail, and escape and flight after abandonment of the loot are
not normally to be considered part of the perpetration of the felony. See notes
(1933) 24 J. CRIM. L. 598, (19o4) 63 L. R. A. 360-372.
107
Supra note 104. State v. Habig, IO6 Ohio St. 151, I40 N. E.
State v. Daniels, 119 Wash. 557, 205 Pac. 1054 (1922).

195 (1922);
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for the killing of a human being 'by a person engaged in the commission of, or in an attempt to commit a felony' ... by statute extends
to all concerned in the felony or 'attempt to commit a felony'...,u08
While Section 1044 of the Penal Law in terms refers only to the
person who actually does the killing, Section 2 reads:
"A person concerned in the commission of a crime, whether
he directly commits the act constituting the offense or aids and
abets in its commission, and whether present or absent, and a
person who directly or indirectly counsels, commands, induces
or procures another to commit a crime is a 'principal'."
Hence,
"... it is immaterial whether one or all of the conspirators
intended to use force, whether they were armed or unarmed,
whether one or all were actually present when the murder was
committed. The design to effect death is not an element of the
crime. If in fact, one did kill 'while engaged in the commission
of a felony', all are guilty of murder in the first degree."' 0 9
2. In another group of decisions the court is not content to rely
upon the statute alone, but rests the liability of those who collaborated in the underlying felony upon the principle that all who
engage in a conspiracy to commit an unlawful act are responsible
for the natural and probable results of their common undertaking." 0
3. The third group embraces a theory which is really not part of the
felony murder doctrine, but which is regularly confused with it because the defendants were at the time of the homicide engaged in a
felony and because, in addition, felony murder may have been presented' as an alternative theory. In these cases all the conspirators
are held equally guilty because their common design included an
actual intent to kill if necessary to attain their objects or because the
homicide was "a natural result of a conspiracy or plan mutually to
resist and overcome any opposition to escape."'' Here their responsibility rests not upon their participation in any felony, but upon
an actual intention in one or all to take a life." 2

108Peoplev. Ryan, 263 N. Y. 298, 302, 189 N. E. 225,226 (1934).
*'1People v. Michalow, 229 N. Y. S25, 330, 128 N.E. 228, 230 (1920).
nOPeople v. Giro, 197 N. Y. 152, 9o N. E. 432 (191o); People v. Friedman, 205
N. Y. 161, 98 N. E. 471 (1912); People v. Giusto, 2o6 N. Y. 67, 99 N. E. 190
(1912); People v. Nichols, 23o N. Y. 221, 129 N. E. 883 (1921); Peoplev. Collins,
234 N. Y. 355, 137 N. E. 753 (1922); People v. Udwin, 254 N. Y. 255, 172 N. E.
489 (1930).

"'People v. Walsh, 262 N. Y. i4o, 148, 186 N. E. 422, 424 (1933).
n2Ruloff v. People, 45 N. Y. 213 (187); People v. Wilson, 145 N. Y. 628, 4o
N. E. 392 (895); People v. Marwig, 227 N. Y. 382, 125 N. E. 535 (1919); People
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It should not be overlooked that, under any of these theories, the

accomplice in the felony is responsible, as at common law, for only
those acts of his associate which are committed in pursuance to the
common design, and not for any independent excursions distinct
from the joint undertaking. To illustrate:
"If A andlB start out together with the design to kill C and
while that design exists, B kills D as a separate and distinct act
not as part of the offense designed against C, A is not guilty of
the crime of murder in the first degree, or of any crime, merely
because he has murder in his heart, directed at C at the time of
such killing."' '

3

As in New York, the accomplice in the felony everywhere finds
great difficulty in escaping the consequences of a killing perpetrated
by his associates in the prosecution of a common design. The usual
jargon is that of conspiracy-either a conspiracy to commit an unlawful act the natural and probable result of which is homicide (class 2
above) or a conspiracy to aid each other to the extent of killing if
necessary (class 3 above).114 The word "conspiracy" in connection
with the felony murder doctrine is used in a rather limited sense.
"Conspiracy itself is not a felony. It is but a misdemeanor.
Each conspirator is liable, however, for the acts of every associate
done in the effort to carry the conspiracy into effect. If, therefore, the conspiracy be to commit a felony of such a nature as
burglary or robbery, if by one conspirator that felony is actually
committed or attempted, if in the course of it a person is killed,
every conspirator is guilty.of murder."'1 5
The "conspiracy" reasoning has led to the following rules:,
i. If there is a joint undertaking to commit a felony, all of the
conspirators are equally responsible for at least those homicides
committed by one of their number in carrying out the felonious purpose which are the natural and probable result of the undertaking.
v. Sobieskoda, 235 N. Y. 411, 139 N. E. 558 (1923); People v. Emieleta, 238 N. Y.
x58, 144 N. E. 487 (1924).
The theory upon which the court is proceeding is not always clear, and a certain
amount of overlapping will be found within the divisions listed above. The following cases likewise hold the confederates in the felony guilty of the felony murder,
but do not explain their grounds sufficiently to warrant classification: People v.
Flanigan, 174 N. Y. 356, 66 N. E. 988 (1903); People v. Madas, 2oI N. Y. 349,
94 N. E. 857 (i9 'I); People v. Fisher, 249 N. Y. 419, 164 N. E. 336 (1928); People
v. Martone, 256 N. Y. 395, 176 N. E. 544 (1931).
13
People v. Sobieskoda, 235 N. Y. 4II, 416, 139 N. E. 558, 560 (1923).
" 4For a long note and extensive collection of cases on homicide in carrying out
an unlawful conspiracy, see (1905) 68 L. R. A. 193.
'15Peoplev. Collins, 234 N. Y. 355,36o, 137 N. E. 753,755 (1922).
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All are guilty of felony murder.116 "An express agreement by intending
robbers not to kill in carrying out a plan of robbery would not save
any of the conspirators from responsibility for a homicide by one of
them in committing or attempting to commit the robbery, if such
killing was the natural and probable result of the robbery or attempt
to rob."

7

2. If there is a joint undertaking to commit a felony and also to
aid each other in escape, all are responsible for those homicides committed in the course of the felony or of the escape which are the
natural and probable result of the common venture. If the killing
occurred in the course of the felony, it is felony murder in all. If in
the escape, all are guilty of the same crime as the actual killer,
whether that be first degree murder, second degree murder, or manslaughter.118 If, however, the conspiracy included an intent to kill if
necessary in carrying out its object, all will be guilty of deliberate
and premeditated murder.11 9 A combination for escape cannot be
inferred from the combination to do the original wrong, 20 but the
mere fact of combined effort or resistance is sufficient to support a
12
finding by the jury that escape was part of the common enterprise. '
The conspiracy to kill, with sufficient deliberation and premeditation
11

Williams v. State, 8I Ala. I, 1 So. I79 (1886); People v. Olsen, 8o Cal. 122
(1889); Lamb v. People, 96 Ill.
73 (188o); see note (1927) 6 L. R.A. (N.S.) 1154.
"'People v. Friedman, 2o5 N. Y. I6I, 165,98 N. E. 471, 473 (1912). Sometimes
this rule is stated without the qualification that the killing be the natural and
probable result. People v. Vasquez, 49 Cal. 56o, 563 (1875); i MITCHIE, HomrCIDE (1914) 53. Occasional cases can be found which hold that all who engaged
in the felony are guilty of the homicide committed by one of them and which yet
use neither the term "conspiracy" nor the phrase "natural and probable result."
State v. Shelledy, 8 Iowa 477 (1859); Brennan v. People, 15 Ill.
511 (1854); Hanna
v. People, 86 Ill.
243 (1877).
""The conspiracy doctrine was carried to a questionable extreme in State v.
Terrell, 175 La. 758, 144 So. 488 (1932), where all who joined a conspiracy to rob
and to divide the spoils were held guilty of murder, though the killing was done
by parties in flight several blocks from the scene of the crime, and though the loot
was being carried off in another direction. The court approved a charge that if the
conspiracy was not only to rob, but also included and extended to a division of
the spoils, then "any act or declaration of one of the conspirators performed or
done after the robbery, but before a division or disposition of the proceeds of the
robbery had taken place between the conspirators, is binding upon all the conspirators, and the act of one is the act of all." The case is criticized in note (1933)
18 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 439.
"19People v. Pool, 27 Cal. 573 (1865); State v. Klein, 97 Conn. 321, i16 Atl.
596 (1922); English v. State, 34 Tex. Crim. R. 190, 30 S.W. 233 (1895); State v.
Morgan,
22 Utah 162, 61 Pac. 527 (I9OO).
1
2People v. Knapp, 26 Mich. 112 (872); Frank v. State, 27 Ala. 37 (x855).
12
Commonwealth v. Brown, 9o Va. 671, 19 S. E. 447 (1894).
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for first degree murder, may be formed in the course of the escape.122
3. In a few jurisdictions all parties to a conspiracy to commit a
felony, whether or not the common design included escape, will be
held guilty of felony murder even where the homicide occurred
during flight, providing it was so closely connected with the felony
as to be part of the res gestae.w
Without casting doubt upon the general rule that conspirators
are responsible only for the natural and probable results of their
cofinion design, a query may be interposed whether this qualification is appropriate where, as in New York, statutes (i) seem to make
killings by a person engaged in a felony first degree murder even
when it is not a natural and probable result if engaging in the felony,
and (2) make all participants in a crime principals.'9 Suppose, for
example, A and B conspire to commit the felony of concealing stolen
goods. A negotiates with the thieves, and then B, in backing up his
truck to unload the goods, accidentally kills a bystander. Certainly
the death was not the natural and probable result of the common
undertaking. Yet, if B could be held folt felony murder, is there anything in the statutes to suggest that A could not?
Since convictions for felony murder seem confined almost entirely
to undertakings which involved substantial risk to human life,
limiting the liability of the conspirators to natural and probable
results of their common undertaking has, in any event, little practical
effect. Normally it adds nothing to the rule that the accomplice is
responsible for only those acts of his associate which are committed
in pursuance of the common design, and not for any distinct and
independent acts. 2 ' But it may go far beyond this rule in cutting
down the responsibility of the accomplice, as when it is interpreted
to mean that only if the felony agreed to be done is dangerous or
homicidal in its character, or if its accomplishment will necessarily
or probably require the u~e of force and violence, will the participant
in the underlying felony be responsible for a felony murder committed by one of his confederates.12 A court taking this position must
inFrancis v. State, 104 Neb. 5, 175 N. W. 676 (I919); Territory v. McGinnis,
Io N. M. 269, 61 Pac. 208 (1goo); Brooks v. Commonwealth, 61 Pa. 352 (1869).
The law of New York seems to be in accord with the propositions stated in this
paragraph. Ruloff v. People, 45 N. Y. 213 (1871); People v. Marwig, 227 N. Y.
382, 125

N. E. 535

(1919).

InConrad v. State, 75 Ohio St.

124

52,

78 N. E. 957 (19o6).
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inState v. Keleher, 74 Kan. 631, 87 Pac. 738 (19o6).
inLamb v. People, 96 IUl. 73 (188o), where defendant was not held responsible
for a homicide committed by his fellow conspirator while engaged in carrying out
their common undertaking, the felony of concealing stolen goods.
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either progress therefrom to the view that the entire felony murder
doctrine applies only to felonies involving danger to human life, or
create an apparently unwarranted distinction between the killer and
his accomplices in the underlying felony.
SoME MISCELLANEOUS RULES GOVERNING THE TRIAL
The common law form of indictment for murder may be used in a
trial for felony murder. 27 The indictment is sufficient when it simply
accuses the defendant of having killed the deceased "willfully,
feloniously and with malice, aforethought", 2 8 for this state of mind
can be established at the trial by showing that the homicide occurred
while the defendant was engaged in the commission of another
felony,'2' on the theory that the malicious and premeditated intent
to perpetrate one kind of felony is by implication of law transferred
from such offense to the homicide which was actually committed. 130
Because of this conception that the function of the independent
felony is merely to supply the requisite state of mind for murder, it
has been held that only the homicide need be proved by independent
evidence. Thus a confession without corroborating evidence is
sufficient to prove the underlying felony. 31
Where cases are tried on the theory of felony murder, the court
must submit to the jury the various forms or grades of homicide,
unless the inculpatory facts are susceptible of the single interpretation that the accused either was engaged in an independent felony
at the time of the killing or did not kdll at all.1 2 When the persons
2

2'The reasons for this rule are fully discussed in People v. Nichols, 230 N. Y.

221, 129 N. E. 883 (1921), which cites State v. Johnson, 72 Iowa 393, 34 N. W.
177 (1887); Statev. Meyers, 99 Mo. 107, 12 S. W. 516 (1889); ExparteDela, 25

Nev. 346, 6oPaC. 217 (19oo); and Titus v. State, 49 N. J. L. 36, 7 Atl. 621 (1886)
in accord.
28

People v. Giblin, 115 N. Y. 196, 21 N. E. io62 (1889); People v. Schermer-

horn, 203 N. Y. 57, 96 N. E. 376 (1911).
12
'People v. Conroy, 97 N. Y. 62 (1884).
'13 People v. Enoch, 13 Wend. i59, 174 (N. Y. 1834).
r'ePeople v. Lytton, 257 N. Y. 3IO, 178 N. E. 290 (193), cting memorandum
opinions in, People v. Hirsch, 254 N. Y. 570, 173 N. E. 870 (193o) and People v.

Metelsld, 256 N. Y. 658, 177 N. E. i81 (1931). But see opinion of Crane, J. in
People v. Joyce, 233 N. Y. 61, 134 N. E. 836 (1922), and critical note in (1933) 7
ST. JOHN's L. REv. 328.
32
People v. Van Norman, 231 N. Y. 454, 132 N. E. 147 (1921); People v. Koerber, 244 N. Y. 147, 155 N. E. 79 (1926); People v. Seller, 246 N. Y. 262, 158
N. E. 615 (1927); People v. Martone, 256 N. Y. 395, 276 N. E. 544 (1931). People
v. Sullivan, 173 N. Y. 122, 65 N. E. 989 (I9O3), points out that the usual practice

is to submit the case to the jury on both the theory of a killing with deliberate and
premeditated design to take life and the theory of a killing in the commission of a

FELONY MURDER DOCTRINE
who acted in the killing are on trial, exceptional conditions are
required to warrant a refusal to instruct the jury as to its power to
convict of a lower degree of the crime charged."' When, however,
their accomplices in the underlying felony who were not otherwise
involved in the homicide are on trial, a verdict of second degree
murder or manslaughter would be erroneous, and the jury is to be
instructed that its verdict must be a conviction of first degree murder
or an acquittal.13 Although the law thus appears to treat the accomplice more harshly than the killer, there may be occasions when the
distinction will work to the advantage of the accomplice. A jury,
unable to bring in a verdict carrying with it a penalty less than death,
may quail before the responsibility of condemning the accomplice to
death and bring in a verdict of acquittal. In one case, where the jury
was erroneously allowed to find an accomplice guilty of manslaughter,
the defendant appealed and secured a new trial on the ground that
he could be connected with the homicide only if he were proved an
accessory to the robbery and, therefore, had to be found guilty of
first degree murder or acquitted.1 5
OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS
This study of felony murder suggests the following problems of
policy:
x. Should the felony murder rule be limited to certain enumerated
felonies which normally involve danger to human life? Or should it
be limited even more strictly to felonious acts involving a foreseeable
element of human risk? Should anything be done to prevent the
application of the New York felony murder doctrine to such extremes
as the hypothetical situation in which a person in attempting to
perpetrate grand larceny accidentally jabs with his pen somebody
whom he is trying to deceive in connection with his scheme, causing
blood poisoning to set in and death to result? Or can the courts be
considered free under our present statutes, and can they be counted
on, to incorporate the mollifying principles being developed in England?
2. Should thd degree of the crime and the punishment for it be
reduced, as in Wisconsin and Minnesota?
felony; and that there is no inconsistency between them, since a felony murder
can13be with or without a design to effect death.
1 People v. Schleiman, 197 N. Y. 383, 9o N. E. 950 (1910); People v. Moran,
246 N. Y. ioo, 102, I58 N. E. 35, 36 (1927).
1
3Peoplev. Seiler, 246 N. Y. 262, I58 N. E. 615 (1927); People v. Martone, 256
N. Y. 395, 176 N. E. 544 (izI).
"15T1d.
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3. Should the parties to the underlying, felony other than those
who did the killing be freed from responsibility for felony murder and
be subject to indictment only for the underlying felony? Or should
they be held responsible for the homicide, but the degree of their
offense be reduced? Have the courts by their frequent use of the
phrase "natural and probable" limited the responsibility of the
accomplice to those homicides which were within the foreseeable
risks of the common venture? If, as the writers believe, the courts
have not committed themselves to such a limitation, should it be
written into the statutes?
4. Should a distinction be maintained between homicides by
persons engaged in the commission of felonies and homicides by
persons engaged in the commission of misdemeanors or civil wrongs?
Or should honicides resulting from any kind of unlawful act involving substantial danger to human life be treated alike?
LIMITATION OF THE SCOPE OF THE FELONY MURDER DOCTRINE

In England there have been outcries against "the harsh, medieval
and repulsive doctrine of constructive murder." 3 ' In the United
States the felony murder doctrine (or "doctrine of constructive murder") has been rather placidly accepted, at least with reference to
the person whose act caused the death. One writer who is vehement
in his denunciation of the doctrine when it is applied to parties connected with the homicide only by participation in the underlying
felony accepts the rule' without question in its application to the
actual killer.3 7 It is true that in the reported cases the person committing the homicide usually arouses little sympathy and seems to
deserve severe punishment, while his associates in the underlying
felony sometimes appear much less blameworthy. Where a felony
is planned by means not dangerous to human life, and especially
where there is an express agreement not to use violence, the infliction
of the death penalty upon a conspirator whose associate kills somebody hardly satisfies the layman's formula of "making the punishment fit the crime". This situation suggests on its surface the necessity
of limiting the application of the felony murder rule to the killer
alone, or perhaps of modifying the rule so as to exempt the participants in the underlying felony under certain conditions and to reduce
their punishment under others. In view of the statutes abolishing
the common law distinctions between principals and accessories,"3 8
the creation of new differences in their treatment seems unwarranted
lu"Constructive Murder" (1929) 67 L. J. 450.
'"Eisenberg, The Doctrine of Felony Murder in New York, N. Y. L. J., Jan. 17,
18, 1935, at 296, 316.
13SB. g., N. Y. PENAL LAW § 2.
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and, furthermore, would not reach the fundamental objections to
the present law of felony murder. A man who, unarmed, stages a
hold-up by pretending to have a gun in his pocket and causes his
victim to die of heart failure induced by fright should certainly be
treated no worse than a robber who planned a similar hold-up, but
whose accomplice, without his knowledge, brought along a gun and
used it with fatal results. The remedy lies in another direction-in
a redefinition of the felony murder doctrine in terms which would
make it applicable only where the culpability of the defendant is
such as would warrant the imposition of extreme penalties.
Little would be accomplished by a return to the New York statute
of i86o, whereby unintended homicides became murder in the first
degree only if committed "in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, or burglary, or in any attempt to
escape from imprisonment." Although these felonies normally involve danger to human life, some of them may be undertaken, as is
indicated by the various hypothetical cases already stated, without
violence and without any recognizable risk of causing death. On the
other hand, felonies normally harmless to life may be undertaken by
highly dangerous means. Under such statutes, furthermore, technicalities arise which reflect no credit on the law, as in the recent Hatiptmann case, where, in order to establish murder in the first degree, the
state had to prove that the baby was killed during the short time
that the defendant was engaged in a burglary, kidnapping not being
one of the felonies specified in the New Jersey murder statute.
Progress lies in the direction taken by the English courts-in the
limitation of the felony murder rule to felonious undertakings which
involve physical violence or danger to human life. In 1878 and 1879
the English Criminal Code Commission devoted much attention to
the subject of felony murder, and "the prevalent opinion seems to
have been that cases of constructive murder should be limited to
cases where the felonious act intended was cruel or more or less
eiusdem geieris with murder."' 39 In their Draft Criminal Code,
which was never adopted, the felony murder doctrine survived only
in the proposition that a crime is murder "If the offender for any
unlawful object does an act which he knows, or ought to have known,
to be likely to cause death and thereby kills any person, though he
may have desired that his object should be effected without hurting
any one."'140 This definition, according to Judge Stephen, "repro13"Some Points on the Law of Murder (1903) 67 JUST. P. 530, 531.
'40Ibid. The "conspiracy" principle apparently would bring those who joined
in the underlying unlawful design within the scope of this rule.
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duces in plain language that part of the existing law which would be
41
in harmony with the common standard of moral feeling."
Three things are to be noted in this proposal:
i.Dangerous acts intentionally performed for an unlawful purpose,
whether -they constitute a felony, a misdemeanor, or a civil wrong,
are treated alike. The scope of this study being limited to homicides
committed in the course of felonies, the writers venture no comment
upon the desirability of this innovation.
2. The intimation in Regina v. Sern6'42 that the defendant must
have had knowledge of the risk to human life is not heeded; he can
be convicted of murder if the risk would have been apparent to a
reasonable man.
3. The act must have been one likely to cause death. If the felony
murder doctrine is applicable only when it is likely or probable that
death will result, it would not be murder to cause death by the physical violence of rape or by suffocation in gagging a victim in robbery.
If such situations are not to be excepted, a weaker link than "likely"
must he used.
It is not necessary to go so far as the Draft Code in departing from
existing conceptions of the felony murder rule in order to obviate the
major objections to it. A satisfactory statement of the rule appeared
some twenty years after the Draft Code in the syllabus of Regina v.
Whitmarsh:'4 "If a man by the perpetration of a felonious act brings
about the death of a fellow creature, he is guilty of murder, unless
when he committed the felonious act the chance of death resulting
therefrom was so remote that no reasonable man would have taken
it into consideration." Under this rule the parties to the underlying
felony who are not otherwise connected with the homicide would
be guilty of murder only if the common enterprise which caused the
death were one involving risks to human life of which they should
have been aware. In such an enterprise an agreement not to kill
should have no force in mitigating their punishment.
The acceptance of risk to human life as the essential element in
the definition of felony murder is the least that can be done to justify
the survival of the felony murder doctrine. Cogent arguments can
be given for limiting the doctrine still further or for reducing the
punishment for felony murder. Nevertheless, though the felony
murder doctrine confined within the bounds suggested may still be
harsh, it will not be "medieval and repulsive".
lUfbid
4

M'Supraat p. 291.
462 JUST.P. 711 (1898).

